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Mastering Bolshevism
R c p r t 6jr Joseph Stalin, Gsnerd Sccr c t q , to the PZmm (PZemry S c s . )
of thf ~c1ztraZC~nmiitecof iha Comm&.ft Parjy of fh SooMt U n h ,
Mwch 3,1937.

OMRADES, it can be seen from the reports andthe
C
discussion on them at the Plenum that we are dealing here with the following three basic facts:
First, the wrecking and diversive spying work of the
agents of foreign countries, among whom the Trotskyites played an active enough role, affected to some degree
or other all or almost all our organizations, both economic, administrative and Party.
Second, the agents of foreign countries among the
Trotskyites penetrated not only into the lower organizations but also into some responsible positions.
Third, some of our leading comrades, both in the
center and in the localities, were not only unable to
recognize the real faces of these wreckers, diversionists,
spies and murderers, but they were so careless, complacent and naive that not infrequently they themselves assisted the agents of foreign powers to get into various
responsible positions.
These are 'thkee indisputable fa& which naturally
arise from the reports and the discussion on them.
'

1:Political Carelessness
OW can it be explained that our leading comrades,
who have a rich experience of struggle against every
kind of anti-Party and anti-soviet trend, proved to be so
blind and naive in this case that they were unable to
recognize the real face of the enemies of the people, were
unable to discern the wolves in sheep's dothing, were
unable to tear the mask from them?
Can it be stated that the wrecking and diversionalspying-work of the agents of foreign powers who were
busy on the territory of the U.S.S.R. could be something
unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, this cannot
be stated. This is shown by the wrecking acts in various
branches of national economy during the past ten years,
starting with the Shakhty period, which are set *out in
official documents.
Can it be stated that we have lately had no warning
signals and forewarning directives about the wrecking,
spying or terroristic activity of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, this cannot be stated. There
were such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget
them,
The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning showing that the enemies of the people will
practice duplicity and, in. doing so, will disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, so as to worn
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POLITICAL CARELESSNESS

their way into our confidence and open a path for themselves into our organizations.
The trial of the "Leningrad Center", like the Zinovievamenev trial, provided new foundations for the lessons
arising from the fact .of the foul murder of Comrade

The trial of the - "Zinoviev-Trotskyite bloc" extended
trials, plainly showing that
e lessons of the
the Zinovievites and Trotskyites unite around themselves
all :the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become
the !spying and diversionist-terroristic-agency of the
German secret police, that doubledealing and concealment are the only means by which the Zinovievites and
etrate into our brganizations, that
keenness are the truest means of
ration, for the liquidation of the
ittee of the C.P.S.U. in its closed
35, regarding the foul murder of
a resolute warning to the Party orolitical complacency and parochial.
rtunist complacency
uppasition that in
wth of our forces the enemy
and more inoffensive. Such a
It is a belch of the
assured everyone that the
socialism, that in
real socialists. It

not the business of the ~ohh&kstoereston t
h
e
laurels and .stand around gaping. It is not complacenq that .we need but vigilance, real Bolshevik
. .mvoIutionaryvigilance. It must be remembered that
the more desperate the position of the enemies, the
more willing they will be to seize on extreme mew
ares as the only measures of doomed people in
their struggle against Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant."
IS

,
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In the dosed letter of ~ u 29,l agb6,
~
regarding the
spying and terroristic activity of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc, the Central Committee of the CP.S.U. called on
the Party organization to show the maximum vigilance,
to 'be able to 'recognize the enemies f the people no
matter how well masked. It says in th . closed letter:
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"Now when it has been proved d t the TrotskyiteZinovievite scum unite allthe mosi bitter and sworn
country-spies,
enemies of the working people
Guards,
agents provocateurs,
ku1&, etc.-in the
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Trotskyites and Zinovjevites
the other, all our
Party o ~ i z a t i o n s all
,
of the Party miwit
understand that the
of Communists is
necessary in every
all situations. An
indispensable
of everdr Bolshevik in the
present conditions must
. to recognize
the enemy of the Party
well .he be
masked."
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POLITICAL C A R E L E W E S

.Sosignals and warnings were .given.
What did these signals and warnings call for?
They called. for the liquidation of the w e a b of
Party organizational work and the coaversio~of the
Party into an impregnab1& .fortress into whicb not a
dngle double-de?ler muld penetrate.
- They called for putting a stop to the underestimation
of Party political work and making a resolute turn
i.1. the direction of strengthening such work to the
ummt, in thk direction of strengthening political
And what happened? The facts have shown .that our
es took in these signals and warnings with more
This is eloquently shown by all the facts which we
from the sphere of the campaign for verifying and
anging Party documents.
How can it be explained that these warnings and
ignals did not produce the proper action? How can it
e explained that our Party comrades in spite of their
rience of struggle against antiSoviet elements, in
te of a whole series of warning signals and forewarnng directives, proved to be politically shortsighted in the
ce of the wrecking and spying divenive work of the
nemies of the people? .
Is it that our Party comrades have become worse than
ey were before, have become less conscientious and
sciplined? No, of course not.
it that they have begun to degenerate?'Again, no.
a supposition is completely unfounded.

T
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MASTERING BOLSHEVISM
Then, what is the matter? Whence arises such gaping,
carelessness, complacency, blindness?
The fact is that our Party comrades, carried away by
economic campaigns and by enormous successes on the
front of economic construction, simply forgot some very
important facts which Bolsheviks havemo right to forget.
They forgot one fundamental fact from the sphere of
the international- position of the U.S.S.R. and did not
notice two very important facts which apply directly to
the present wreckers, spies, diversionists and murderers
sheltering behind the Party card and disguised as
Bolsheviks.

2 : Capitalist Encirclement

w

H A T are these facts which our Party comrades
forgot, or which they simply did not notice? They forgot that Soviet power has conquered only
one-sixth of the world, that five-sixths of the world is in
the possession of capitalist powers. They forgot that the
Soviet Union is in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. It is an adcepted thing to talk loosely about capitalist encirclement, but people do not want to ponder
upon what sort of a thing this capitalist encirclement is.
Capitalist encirclement-that is no empty phrase; that
is a very real and unpleasant feature. Capitalist encirclement means that here is one country, the Soviet Union,
which has established the socialist order on its own territory and besides this there are many countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to carry on a capitalist
mode of life and which surround the Soviet. Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack it, break it, or at any rate
to undermine its power and weaken it.
Our comrades forgot this fundamental fact. But it is
that precisely which determines the basis of relations between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.
Take for example the bourgeois states. Simple-minded
people may think that extremely good relations reign
between them, as between states of the same type. But
only simple-minded people can think so. In reality the
11
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relations between them are far from being those of g o d
neighbors. It hasrbeen proved as.plainly as two and two
make four that thii :bourgebEs btates; shower,their spies,
' wre&ers,
divcrsionists and sometimes murderers on each
other, behind their frontiers; give them instructions to. .
~ o r i mthemselves intd . the fietorieg ind institutions iif
.
these'states, to mate theif .own network there and "in
case of necessity" to 'smash th& h m the rear so as
to weaken them and undermine their power. Such is the .
case at the present time.
Such, too, has been the case in the past.-&Takefdr
example the countries of Europe at the time of Napoleon
the First. France at that time was swarming with spies
and diversionists from the camp of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. And, at the same time,
England, the German states, Austea, zind Russia had
behindatheirlines no fewer spies and diversionists kroih
the French camp. Agents of. Great Britain *twicemade .
attempts on the life of Napoleon, and several times
mwcd the peasants of the Vendee in Prance againit
the government of Napoleon. ~ n what
d was Napoleotl's
government? ' A ' bourgeois gavematent which had
strangled the Freniih ~evoiutionand retained only those
resurts of the revolution which were profitable to .the
big bourgeoisie. Needless to say, Napoleon's governrrtent
did not remain ilidebted to its neighbors. It also undertook 'its own diversional measures. Such was the case ip
the past,.130 ye- -ago. Such is the case now, 130 gears
after Napoleon the; First. France and England at )the
present day are swarining with Gmmannspies and diver- . .
,
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CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT

sionists and, on, the other hand, Anglo-French spies and
diversionists in turn are at work in Germany. America
is swarming .with Japanese spies and diversionists, and
Japan with American.
Su.ch is the law of relations between bourgeois states.
. The-question must be put: why should the bourgeois
countries be gentler and more neighborly to the Soviet
socialist government than they are to bourgeois states of
their awn type? Why should they send fewer spies, wreckers, diversionists and murderers behind the frontiers of
the Sayiqt Union than they send behind the frontiers
of bourgeois countries which are akin to them? Where
did you get this from? W i l l it not be truer, from the
point of view of Marxism, to suppose that the bomgewiir
sbtes ,must be sending 'twice or three times as many
~ ~ e c k e rspies,
s a 'diversionists and murderers behind tde
lines of the soviet Union +an beknd those of any
bourgeo@ state?
Is it not dear mat as long as capitalist encirclement
exists there yill ' be hecken, spies, diversionists and
murderers in our country, sent behind our lines by the
agents of fore* qtates?
Our Party cbmrades forgot about all this, and having
forg~ttenwere cauiht .unawares.
This is why the spying and diversive work of the
~rotskyiteagents df the Japanese and ~ e n n i nsecre!
police was completely unexpected by some
our
comrades.
'

'

,
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3 : Present-Day Trotskyism
.

T

0 PROCEED. In carrying on a struggle against the
rrotskyite agents, our Party comrades did not notice,
they overlooked the fact, that presentday Trotskyism is
no longer what it was, let us say, seven or eight years
ago; that Trotskyism and the Trotskyites have passed
through a serious evolution in this period which has
utterly changed the face of Trotskyism; that in view of
this the struggle against Trotskyism and the method of
struggle against it must also be utterly changed. Our
Party comrades did not notice that Trotskyism has
ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that
it has changed from the political trend in the working
class which it was seven or eight years ago, into a frantic
and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies
and murderers acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states.
What is a political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group or a party which
has its own definite political face, platform and program,
which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class but, on the contrary, openly and honestly carries
on propaganda for its views in full view of the working
class, does not fear to show its political face to the working class, does not fear to demonstrate its real aims and
tasks to the working class but, on the contrary, goes to

PRESENT-DAY TROTSKYISM
the working class with open visor to convince it of the
correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years
ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the
working dass, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true, and
therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a po- l i t i d trend.
Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, the 1936
Trotskyism, let us say, is a political trend in the working
class? No, this cannot be said. Why? Because the presentday Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the
Gorking class, are afraid to disclose their real aims and
tasks to it, and carefully hide their political face from
the working class, fearing that if the working class should
learn of their real intentions it will curse them as an
alien people and drive them from it. This in reality explains how it is that the chief method of Trotskyite
work is now not open and honest propaganda of its
views among the working class, .but the masking of
its views, servik and fawning praise for the views of its
opponents, a false.and pharisaical trampling of its own
views in the dirt.
If you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev at the trial
in 1936 strenuously denied that they had any political
platform. It was fully possible for them to develop their
political platform at the trial. But they did not do so,
declaring that they had no political platform. There can
be no doubt that both of them were lying when they
denied that they had a - platform. Even the blind can
now see that they had their political platform. But why
did they deny the existence of any political platforin?
'
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Beduse they were,afraid to disclose their real political
face, they were a f ~ to
d demonstrate their real platform
for -the maration d capitalism-in the U.S.S.R., fearing
that such a .platfom would arouse revulsion in the
wwking dm.
At the trial in 1997, Piatakov, Radek and ~&lnikov.
took a Merent line. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They
admitred' that they had a definite, political' platform,
recognized and unfolded i t in their testimony. But they
unfolded it not to call on the working dass, not to 4 E
on the peopl& to suppoit the Trotskyite platform, but
in order to curse it'and brand it as an anti-people's and
anti-proletarian platform.
The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of
collective farms and state. farms3 the restoration of the
system af exploitation, an,alliance with the fascist forces
of :
m y and Japan, to bring war against tbe Sovieb
Usqioq nmpgr.. 9 q~gg143,for war, and againyt the policy
cd pew, the tg-riturial dismemberment of the Soviet
Union,' giving the Ukraine to the Germans and the
maritime proyipcat to-:the Japanese, the preparation of
the. military defeat of the Soviet. Union if enemy states
should attack it, ,an&.as a means of achieving these tasks*
wrecking, diversion, ,Mividual temrism against the
leadem of the,Soviet government, espionage f o r the benefit o f the Japan- and Gerpan fascist forces-such was
the political platform of presentday Trotskyism which
wag,set fQrtb by Piatakov, Radekuld Sokolnikov. .
Nanually the Trotskyites could not but hide such a
:

a

1L

'

PRESENT-DAY TRQTSKYISM
platform from the people, from the working class. And
' they hid it not only from the working class but also
. from the Trotskyite rank and file, and not only from the
Trotskyite rank and file but even from the leading group
of the Trotskyites, consisting of a small handful of go or
40 people. When Radek and Piatakov asked Trotsky's
t permission to call a small conference, go or 40 people, to
inform them of ,the character of this platform, Trotsky
forbade them, saying it was ivexpedient to talk of the
real nature of the platform even to a small group .of
Trotskyites as such an "operation" might cause a split.
"Political figures" hiding their views and their .platform not only from the working dab but also from.the
Trotskyite rank and file, and not only from the Trotskyite rank and file, but from the leading group of Trotskyites+~& is the face of presentday Trotskyism.
But it follows from this that presentday Trotskyism
can no longer be called a political trend in the working
class. Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in
the working class but a gang without principle, without
ideas, of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service
agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the
working class, working in the pay of the intelligence
services of foreign states.
such is the indisputable result of the evolution qf
Trotskyism in the past seven or eight years.
Such is the differknce between Trotskyism in the pas1
and ~ r o t s k ~ i sat
m the present time.
The mistake of our Party comrades is that they did
not notice this profound difference between Trotskyism
'
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in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They
did not notice that the Trotskyites have long since
ceased to be people devoted to an idea, that the Trotskyites have long since turned @to highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to
the point of-espionage d the outright betrayal of their
country, if only they can harm the Soviet government
and Soviet power. They did not notice this and were
. therefore unable to reconstruct themselves in time to
wage battle against the Trotskyites in a new and more
regular manner. This is why the abominable work of
the Trotskyites of late years was a complete surprise for
some of our Party comrada.
T o proceed. Finally, our Party comrades did not notice
that there is an important difference between the presentday wreckers and diversionists, on the one hand, among
whom the Trotskyite agehts of fasc&m play "an active
part", and the wreckers and diversionists of the time of
the shkkhty trial, on the other hand.
In the first place, the Shakhty and Industrial Party
wreckers were people openly alien to us. They were in
greater part fornet- &hers of factories, former - man. agen for the old employers, form& shareholders of old
joint-stock .companies, or simple bourgeois specialists who
were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people
had any doubt abow the authenticity of the political
face of these gentlemen. And the sh;khty wreckers themselves did not conceal their distaste for the Soviet system.
The same cannot be said -of the 'presentday:wreckers
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PRESENT-DAY TROTSKYISM

ers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are mostly Party
people with a Party card in their pocket, and consequently people who formally are not alien to us.
Whereas the old wreckers went against our people, the
new wreckers on the contrary cringe to our people, laud
them, lickl their boots, in order to worm their way into
their confidence. As you see, the difference is essential.
In the second place, the strength of the Shakhty and
Industrial Party wreckers was that to a greater or lesser
degree they possessed the necessary technical knowledge,
while our people, not possessing such knowledge, were
f o r d to learn from them. This circumstance gave a
great advantage to the wreckers of the Shakhty period,
made it possible for them to4do their weeking work freely aid unhindered; made it possible for them to deceive
our people technically.
This is not .so with the present-day wreckers, with the
Trotskyites. Th,e present-day wreckers have no technical
superioiity over our people. On the contrary, our people
are better trained technically than the presentday
wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the time from the
Shakhty period to our own days, tens of thousands of
genuine, technically strong Bolshevik cadres have grown
up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of
thousands of Bolshevik leading figures technically developed in comparison with whom all such people as
Piatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, Muralov
and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere tyros from
the point of view of technical training. In this case, what
does the strength of the presentday wreckers, the Trot-
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skyites, consist of? Their'strength lies in the Party card,
in the possession of a Party card. This strength lies in
the fact that the Party card gives them pditical trust
and opens the doors of all our institutions and organ-.
izations to them.
Their advantage lies in the fact that holding a Party
card and pretending to be friends of the soviet power
they tricked our peopk politically, misused their cgnfidence, did their wrecking work furtively, and disclosed
our secrets of state to the enemies of the Soviet Union. .
This "advantage" is a doubtful one in its political and
moral values, but still it is an "advantage". This "advan- .
tage", .in reality, explains the fact that the Trotskyite .
wreckers, as people with a Party .card having access to
all
in .our institutions and organizations, were a
real windfall for the intelligence services of foreign states.
The mistake of some.af our Party comrades is that they
did - not . notice, did not understand all this difference
between the old and the- new wreckers, between the
Shakhty wreckers and the Trotskyites, and not noticing
this, they were unable to reconstruct themselves in time
so as to wage battle {againstthe new wreckers in a new
waj.
,

4: The Seamy Side of Economic Success
UCH are the basic facts from the sphere of our interSnational and internal situation, about which many of
our Party comrades forgot, or which they did not, notice.
This is why our people were taken by surprise by the
events of the last few years as regards wrecking and
diversion.
It may be asked: But why did our people not notice
d l this, why did they forget about all this? Where did
all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness and complacency come from?
Is it an organic defect in the work of our people? No,
it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon
which can be rapidly. liquidated by some efforts on the
part of our people.
Then what is the matter?
The matter is that our Party comrades have been
totally absorbed in economic work 'in recent years, have
been engrossed to the limit in economic successes, and
being engrossed in all these things forgot about all else,
threw aside all else.
The matter is that being carried away by economic
successes they began to regard this as the beginning and
end of everything, and simply gave up paying attention
to such things as the international position of the Soviet
Union, capitalist encirclement, strengthening of the

MASTERING BOLSHEVISM
political work of the Party, struggle against wrecking,
etc, supposing all these questions to be second-rate and
even third-rate matters.
Successes and achievements are, of course, a great
thing. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction
are Uvly enonnous.
But successes, like everything else under the sun, have
their seamy side. Among people who are not very skillful
in politics big successes and big achievements not infrequently give rise to carelessness, complacency, self -satiofaction, overweening self-confidence, swell-headedness
and bragging. You cannot deny that braggarts have lately
developed among us tremendously. It is not surprising
in these circumstances of big a n d serious successes in
the sphere of socialist construction that feelings of
boastfulness are created, feelings of showy demonstration of our successes, and feelings-are created for underestimating the strength of our enemies, feelings of
overestimation of our own strength, and as a result of all
this political blindness appears.
I must heax say a few words about the dangers connec.~edwith successeS, about the dangers connected with
achievements.
We know by aperiencx of the dangers connected
with difficulties. For a number of years we have been
fighting against such kinds of dangers, and I must say
not without success. Among people who are not staunch,
dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently give
rise to. dawncast feelings, distrust in their own forces,
feelings of pessimism. And, on the contrary, when it i s

::
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SEAMY SIDE OF SUCCESS

a matter of fighting against the dangers which arise from
difficulties, people are tempered in this struggle and
emerge from the struggle really granite ~olsheviks.
Such is the nature of the dangers connected with dif-.
ficulties. Su* are the results of overcoming difficulties.
But there is another kind of danger, the danger conneaed with successes,' the danger connected with achievemeats Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected with sucesips, with achievements. These dangers consist in the
fact that among people little skilled in politics and not
having*seen much, the condition of. successes-success
after success, achievement after achievement, the overfulfildent of plans after the overfulfilment of plansgives rise to feelings of.carelessness and self-satisfaction,
qeates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual
~ n p t u ~ a t i o which
ns
kill the sense of proportion and
dull polit-ical instinct, take the spring out .of people and
impel them to rest on their laurels.
It is not surprising that in this narcqtic atmosphere
of swell-headedness and self-satisfaction, this atmosphere
of showy d6monstrations and loud self-praise, people forget some essential facts which are of first-grade significance for the fate of our -country; people begin to miss
seeing such unpleasant facts as capitalist encirclement,
the new forms of wrecking, the dangers connected with
our sucdesses, etc
Chpitalist encaement? A mere bagatelle! What sig-.
nifiwnce can some capitalist encirclement or other have
if we fulfill and surpass our economic plans? The new
forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? Mere

.

5 : Our Tasks

H

OW are we to liquidate the shortcomings in our
work? What must be done in order to do this?
It is necessary to: carry out the following measures:
1. First and foremost, the attention of our Party comrades who get bogged on "current questions" in one department or another must be turned towards the big
political questions of both international and internal
character.
2. The political work of our Party must be raised to
the proper level, making the m#n task that of the
political training and Bolshevik steeling of the Party,
Soviet and economic cadres,
3. It should be explained to our Party comrades that
the economic successes, the significance of which is undoubtedly very great and which we shall also strive
for in the future, day after day, year after year, are
nevertheless not the whole of our socialist construction.
It should be explained that the seamy 'sides connected
with economic successes and expressed in self-satisfaction,
in carelessness, in the deadening of political intuition,
can be liquidated only if economic successes are combined with the successes of Party construction and the
developed political work of our Party.
It should be explained that economic successes them-
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selves, their stability and duration, wholly and fully depend on the suclzgses of Party organizational and Party
political wrk,' that without this condition
economkc
- .
. a~&
may prove to be built on sand.
-+It should be rexnembered and never forgotten that.
+.;
,
l
q,-Jcapiaist. ea@rclvent;
,
.,
exists there will i$e
q&km,
' d i + & s i ~ ~ tspies,
. s , tprl:@ts, sent behind t&
fso&cm. of the tk?~+tUnion by
iYte1igence servicof.foreign.states;t ~ aoU~gi'.be
s
rkgaep~beredand a swgcarried on against.bw cbrnrades
gk
. should
underqtimate the significance 'of the fact of capitdigt
endrdement, who underestimate .the strength and s'%nificanae 'ofwrecking.
:.
. It shoul? be'explained to our Party c o ~ d e that
s no
&pno*ic success w&s&ver, no matter how
they
wScan,.amp11 the f? of capitalist tmcirdmmt ~ n dgr ?( l ~
results arising therefrom.
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a gang of wrecken, diversionists, spies, assassins, without
principles and ideas, working for the foreign intelligence
services. .
It should be explained that. in the struggle against
contempbrary Trotskyism, not the old methods, the
, methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods,
methods for smashing and uprooting it.
6.. The difference between the presentday wreckers
and the wreckgrs of the Shakhty period should be explaitied to our' Party comrades. It should be explained
to them*that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhty period
lmisled our people in the sphere of technique, utilizing
their technical backwardness, the presentday wreckers
with a Party card in their possession deceive our people
by utilizing the political trust shown towards them as
Party members, utilizing the political carelessness of
ouy people.

To the old slogan of the mastery of technique which
carresponded to the Shakhty period there must be added
the new slagan calling f o r the political training of cadres,
the mastery of Bolshevism and the liquidation of our
political tmtful~ess,a slogan which fully corresponds
to the-present period we are now passing through.
The question m y be asked: Was it not possible ten
years ago, at the time of the Shakhty period, to advance
both slogans simultaneously, i.e., the first slogan regarding the mastery of technique and, the second slogan regarding the political training of cadres? NQ,it was not
possible. Things are not done that way in the Bolshevik
Party. At the turning points of the revolutionary move47

ment, some basic slogan is always advanced as the key
slogan in order, by catching on to it, to draw in the
whole chain. That is what Lenin taught us: find the
main link in the chain of our work, lay hold of it, draw
it in, in order through it to draw in the whole chain
and go forward. The history of the revolutionary move-.
ment shows that this is the only correct tactic.
In the Shakhty period, the weakness of our people
lay in their technical backwardness. Technical questions
and not political ones were our weak spots at that time.
As far as our political attitude towards the wreckers of
that time was concerned, it was perfectly clear that it
was the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien
people. We liquidated this technical weakneSs of ours
by advancing the slogan regarding the mastery of technique and by educating tens and hundreds of thousands
of teduiically steeled Bolshevik cadres during the past
period.
It is a different question now when we have technically
developed Bolshevik cadres and when the part of wreckers is played not by openly alien people in possession of
technical superiority over our own people, but by people
in possession of Party membership cards and enjoying
all the rights of Party membership. The weakness from
which our people suffer now is not technical backwardness, but political carelessness, blind faith in people who
have come by chance into possession of Party membership
eards, the failure to check up on people .not according
to' the political declarations they make, but according to
the results of the work they do. The key question now
28
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facing us is not the liquidation of the technical backwardness of our cadres, for in the main this has already
been done, but the liquidation of the political carelessness and political trustfulness in wreckers who have by

-

chance obtained possession of Party membership cards.
Such *isthe fundamental difference between the key
question in respect to the struggle for cadres in the
period of the Shakhty days and the key question of the
present period.
That is why ten years ago we' could' and should not
have issued both the slogans together, namely, the one
regarding the mastery of technique*and the one regarding the political training of cadres.
This is why the old slogan of the mastery of technique
must now be supplemented by the new slogan of the
mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres
and the liquidation of our political carelessness.
- 7. We must destroy and cast aside the rotten theory
that with. every advance y e make the class struggle here
of necessity would die down more and more, and that in
proportion as we achieve successes the class enemy woulcl
become more and more tractable.
This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous one,
for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and makes
it
for the class enemy to rally for the struggle
against ,the Soviet government.
On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the
greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the
fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes,
'

\
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the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of struggle,
the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state and the
more will they clutch at the most desperate means of
struggle, as the last resort of doomed people.
It .sh6uld be borne in -mind that the remnants of the
broken classes in the U.S.S.R. are not alone. They have
the direct support of our enemies beyond the bounds of
the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the
sphere of the class struggle is limited to the bounds of
the U.S.S.R. While one end of the class struggle has its
operation within the bounds of the U.S.S.R., its other
stretches to the bounds of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the broken classes cannot but
be aware of this. And precisely because they are, they
will continue their desperate assaults in the future.
This'is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism
teaches us.
We must remember all this and be on our guard.
8. We must destroy and cast aside another rotten
theory according to which the individual who is not
always engaged in wrecking and who even occasiorially
shows successes in his ~ b r k
cannot be a wrecker.
This strange theory exposes the naiiete of its authors.
No wrecker will engage in wrecking all along the line
if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest pos,sible time. On the' contrary, the real wrecker has from
time to time to show successes in his work, for this is
his only means of keeping himself going as a wrecker,
of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his
wrecking work.
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I think that this question is dear and requires n o
further explanation.
g. We must destroy and cast aside the third rotten
theory, to the effect that the .systematic fulmment of
economic plans reduces wrecking and its consequences
to naught.
Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely, to
titillate the self-esteem of our departmental oficials, to
lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking.
What is the meaning of "the systematic fulfilment of
our economic plans"?
First, it has been proved that all our economic plans
are below normal because they do not take account of
the tremendous reserves and possibilities lying hidden
in our national economy.
Second, the geaeral fulfilment of the economic 'plans
by the commissariats as a' whole does - not mean that the
plans -;ire also fulfilled by certain very important
branches. On the contrary, the facts go to show' that
quite a number. of commissariats, which fulfil or even
more than fulfil the economic plans for the year, systematically fail to fulfil the plans in' several very important branches of the national economy. .
Third, there can -be no doubt that had the wreckers
not been exposed and thrown out, the'position in respect to the fulfilment of econbmic plans would have
been far worse. This is something which the shortsighted
authors of the theory under review need to remember.
Fourth, the wreckers usually adapt the main part of
their wrecking work not to the peace-time period, but
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to that of the eve of war or of war itself. Suppose we were
to lull ourselves with the rotten theory of "the system&ic
fulfilment of the economic plans", and were-not to t o u h
the wreckers. .Dothe authors of this rotten theory appre-ciate what a .tremefidous amount of *harmthe wreckers
would do to our country in case of war, if we were to
allow them to remain inside the body of our national
economy, sheltered by the rotten theory of "the systematic fulfilment of economic plans"?
Is it not dear that the theory of "the systematic fulfilment of economic plans" is a theory advantageous to
the wreckers?
lo. We must destroy and cast aside the fourth rotten
theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement i s the
chief means for liquidation of wrecking.
This theory has been invented so as to divert the blow
from the wreckers with a noise of chatter about Stabhanov workers and the Stakhanov movement.
In his report, Comrade Molotov quoted a whole number of facts which go to show how the Trotskyites and
non=m>tskyite wreckers in the Kuznets and Don Basins.
abused the confidence of our politically careless corn-.
rades, systematidly led the Stakhanov workers a .dance,
placed spokes. in their wheels, so to speak, artificially
created a whole number of obstacles preventing theirworking successfuIIy and finally succeeded in disorganizing their work.
What could the Staghanov workers do alone if the waycapital construction was carried on by the wreckem in the
Don Basin, let us say, led to. a gap between the slowly
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inoving prepaptory work of coal mining and all the
other fields of the work?
Is it not deiy that the Stakhanov movement itself is
in need af our effective aid against all the various machinations of the wreckers so as to speed things .on and
to fulfil i t s great mission? Is it not dear that the struggle
against wrecking, for its liquidation, and the gaining of
the upper hand over wrecking is the necessary condition
for the Stakhanov movement to blossom out to the full?
I think that this question is also clear and in no need
of fbrther comment.
1 I. We must destroy and cast aside the fifth rotten
theory to the effect. that the Trotskyite wreckers possess
no more reserve, that they are .mustering their last
reserves.
This is untrue, comrades. Only naive people could
invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their
reserves. These consist first and foremost of the remnants
.ofthe smashed exploiting dasses i n the: U.S.S.R. They
consist of a whole number of groups and organizations
beyond the bounds of the U.S.S.R. and hostile .to the
t Union.
Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary Fourth International, two-thirds of which is made-up
af spies and subversive agents. Isn't this ,a reserve? Is it
not clear that this international of spies will select forces
to,do the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?
Or take, for, example, the group of the rrscal Shefio
i,m Noway, who ?provided a haven for the*arch-Spy
Trotsky and helped hi.m to do harm the Soviet Union;
t
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Isn't. this group a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue in the future to
render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?,
Or.take, for examples the Souvarine group in France,
a gmuP 6f rascals like Sheflo. Isn't this a reserve? Can it
be denied that this group of scoundrels will also help
the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work
.
against the Soviet Union?
All these ladies and gentlemen from Germany, all the
Ruth Fischers, Maslovs and Urbans who have sold themselves body and soul to the fascists-aren't they reserves
for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?
Or'take, for exampIes the well-known gang of American writers headed by the notorious racketeer Eastman,
all these gangsters of the pen who live by slandering the
working class of the Soviet Union-aren't they reserves
for Trotskyism?
No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are mustering. their last for :s must be cast aside.
12. Finally, we must destroy and cast aside still another rotten'.theory t* the effect that since we ~oldheviks
are many while the wreckers are few; since we Bolsheviks
have the siippott of tens of miliions of people while the
Trotskyite wreckers &n be.nuinbered in tens and units,
then we Bo1sh:et;iks.bin afford to pay no attention to
such a handfhl of &&em.
'
tmhrades. . This more than ' strange
his is
theory has been invented 60 as to bring solace to-certain
of 'our Ieading c o d d & who have hiled in theill'ivork .
by reason of their iria-bility to carry on a struggle agaihst

.
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the wrecking, to lull their vigilance and to make it possible for them to sleep in peace.
It is, of course, true that -the Trotskyite wreckers have
the support of isolated individuals, while the Bolsheviks
have the suppurr of. tens of millions of people. But it
by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not
able to inflict very serious damage on us. I t does not at
all need a big number of people to do harm and to
cause damab. Tens of thousands of workers have .to be
set to-work to build a Dnieprostroy, but it requires not
more than a few dozen men to blow it up. Several Red
Army corps may be necessary to win a battle during war
time. But it only needs a few spies somewhere;in the army
headquarters or even in a' divisional staff ta steal the plan
of operations and pass it on to the enemy for this gain to
be lost. Thousands of people are required to build a big
railway bridge, but a few people are sufficient to bl&
it ap. Tens and hundreds of such examples could be
quoted.
Consequently, we must not comfart aurselves with the
fact-that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite-wreckeis, are few.
. We must bring about a situation where there is not
a single Trotskyite wrecker left in our ranks.
This is how the matter stands with. the question of
how to liquidate the shortcomings in our work, common
to all our organizations, economic and Soviet administrative and Party. Such are the. measures necessary for
the liquidation of these shortcomings.
As regards the Party orgartieations in particular and
the defects in their work, the measures necessary to liqui-

-
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date these shortcomings are stated in sufficient detail i !'"'
the draft resolution submitted for your consideration.
therefore think there is no need to enlarge here on thii''';
I ~ ~ o u l d . l i ktoe say just a few words on the questi6"ifq!
of political training and raising the level of our Partyv,,!
cadres.
I think that if we are able, if we succeed in giving !
ideological training to our Party cadres fiom top to
I
bottom and steeling them politically so that they canw:.
find their bearings with ease in the internal and inter@
national situation, if we succeed in making of them fully 1
mature Leninists
and Marxists capable of solving 'the i
I
questions of the leadership of the country without
ing serious mistakes. then we can thereby solve nine&
tenths of' all our tasks.
.Ad
How do things stand with regard to the leading forces
of our Party? .
In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata
there are .about 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders whom I
I would call our Party's corps of generals.
- Ky
Then there are qo,ooo to 4 0 . m middle rank leader$"!
who are our Party.corps of officers.
to 1~0;ooo
of the lowe?'
Then there are about loo,rank Party command staff who are, so to speak, -our,,
Party's non-commissioned officers.
The task is to raise the ideological level and political
vigor of these command cadres and to introduce among ?
them fresh forces awaiting promotion, and thus expand
i
d l
the ranks of our leading forces.
d #)i$$
k

rd

rnakl~i'

1

7
q

OUR TASKS
What d m this require?
First and foremost, we must make the proposal to
aur Party lea&= beginning with secretaries of our Party
units to the secmtaries of regional and republican Party
organizations to select, during a definite 'period, two individual~~two Party functionaries each capable of being
.able to a a as their effective deputies..
The question may be asked: Where are we to get these
-two deputies for each one, if we have no such people, no
workers who correspond to these requirements? This is
incorrect, comrades; We have tens of thousands of capable and talented people. It only needs to know them
and to promote them in time so that they should not
remain in their old places too long and begin to rot.
*Seekand ye shall find.
Further, four-month Party- courses must be establish?ineach regional center to give secretaries of units Party
training and to reequip them. The secretaries of all
primary Party organizations (units) should be sent to
these courses and then when they finish them and return
lhome their deputies and the most capable members of the
primary Party organizations should be sent to these
.courses*
Further, to reequip politically the first secretaries of
the district organizations, eight-month Lenin courses
-must be. established in the U.S.S.R.,in, say, ten of the
most important centen.
The first secretaries of district and regional Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and then .
when they finish them and return home their deputies
37

MASTERING BOLSHEVISM

and the most capable members of the district and regional organizations sent there,
Further, ~ix-monthcourses for the study of history and
the Party's policy under the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union must be set up ta
achieve the' ideological reequipment and political im-provement of secretaries of the town Party organizations.
The first and second secretaries of town Party organizations should be sent to these courses and then when they
.have finished them and return home the most capable
members of the town Party organizations should be
sent there.
. Finally, a six-month conference on questions of internal aqd international #olicy. under the Central Corn-mittee of the C.P.S.U. must be established.
The first secretaries of divisional and provincial or-.
ganizations and the C e n t d committees of the national:
Communist Parties should be sent here. These comrades
should provide not one but several persons really capabl .
.of replacing the leaders of the Central -Committeeof our^
Party. This should and must be done.
I conclude, comrades.
We have thus outlined the main defects in our work,.
including those which are common to all our organizations, economic, piministrative and Party, and also those
which are specifically peculiar to Party organizations only
-defects made use of by the enemies of the working class
for their.diversi~iistand wrecking, espionage and terrorist work.
We have further outlined the chief measures to .be

'
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taken to render harmless and liquidate the diversive,
wrecking, espionage and terrorist assaults of the Trotskyite fascist agents of the foreign intelligence services.
The question arises: Can we carry through all these
measures, do we possess all the necessary possibilities for
this? Undoubtgdly we can. We can, because we have at
our disposal all the means necessary for the realization
of these measures.
What do we lack? We lack only one thing: the readiness to' liqbidate our own carelessness, our own complacency, our own political shortsightedness.
There is the rub. Cannot we who have soverthrown
capitalism, in the main built socialism, and raised aloft
the great banner of world communism, get rid of this
ridiculous and idiotic disease?
We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly
get rid of it, given, of course, thar we will it. We will get
rid of it, no!: just in an ordinary manner but in a Bolshevik fashion, in real fashion.
And when we get rid of this idiotic disease, we can say
with complete confidence that we fear no enemies from
within'or without, we fear none of their assaults, for we
shall shatter them in the future, .as we are doing now and
as we have done in the past. (Applause.)

Concluding Speech

Cquestions of the matter under' discussion. The disOMRADES, I spoke in my report about the basic

cussion has shown that we now have complete clarity,
have an understanding of our tasks, and that there is a
readiness to liquidate the shortcomings of our work. But
the discussion has also shown that there are some concrete
questions of our organizational-political practice on
which we have not as yet a completely clear understanding. Of-these questions, I have counted seven.
,
Allow me to say a few words on these questions.
It is to be supposed that all have now understood
and have realized that to become excessively engrossed
in economic campaigns. and economic successes while
underestimating and forgetting Party political problems
leads up a blind alley. Consequently.it is necessary to
turn the attention of our workers toward Party political
questions, so that economic successes will be combined
with and accompany successes in Party political work.
Hdw in practice is the task of strengthening the Party
political work,,the task of freeing the Party organizations
1.
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from economic details to be carried out? As can be seen
from the discusion, some comrades are prone to draw
the incomct conclusions that we should now get away
altogether from economic work. At any rate, there were
voices sounding this note: "Well, now, thank God, we
shall be rid of economic matters, now we can busy ourselves with Pany political work."
Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not. When our Party
comrades, carried away with economic successes, moved
away from politics, this was an extreme which cost us big
saaifices. If some of our comrades, taking up the task of
strengthening Party political work, now think of moving
away from economy, this will be the other extreme,
which will cost us no fewer sacrifices. You must not jump
from one extreme to another. You must not separate
politics from economy, just as we cannot move away from
politics.
For convenience in study, people usually separate the
methodological questions of economy from the questions
of politics. 'But this is done merely from the standpoint
of method, artificially, only forathe convenience of study.
B& in life, on the contrary, politics and economy are in
practice inseparable. They exist*together. And he who
thinks to separate economy from politics in .our practical
policy, to strengthen economic work at the cost of belittling political work or, contrariwise, to strengthen
politid work at the cost of belittling economic work,
will inevitably find himself up a blind alley.
The particular point in the draft resolution on the
freeing of Party organizations from economic details and
p

'
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the strengthening of Party political work does not mean
moving away from economic work and economic leadership. It means, simply, no. longer to permit the practice
of supplanting and usurping economic organs, among
them especially agricultural organs, by our Party organ. izations. Consequently, it is necessary to master the
method of Bolshevik leadership of economic organs.
which lies in systematically helping these organs, svstematically strengthening them and guiding economy,
not over. the heads of these organs but through them.
The economic organs, and in the first place the agricul-.
tural organs, must be given the best people.
These organs must receive fresh staffs, consisting of
the best workers capable of carrying out the tasks assigned to them. Only after this work has been done will it
be possible to count on the Party organizations being
completely freed from economic details. This is a serious
matter, of course, and requires a certain length of time.
But until it is done, the Party organizations, for a &finite
sho* period, will still have to occupy themselves closely
with agricultural affairs, with all their detiils: plowing,
sowing, harvestings etc.
1 .
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n. - A few words about 'wreckers, diversionists, spies, etc.
It is now clear for all, I think, that the presentday wreckers and diversionists, no matter what Bag they use to
cover themselves, the Trotskyite or the Bukharin flag, .
have long since ceased to be a political trend in the work- ,
ing class movement, that they have turned into a gang of professional wreckers, dive~ionists,spies and murderers,

.
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devoid of principles -and ideas. Of course, these gentlemen will have to be smashed and *ruthlesslyuprooted as
enemies of the working -class, as traitors to our country.
This is clear and does not require further explanation.
But here is the question--how to carry out in practice
the task of smashing and uprooting the German-Japanese
agents of Trotskyism. Does this mean that we should
strike 'and-uprootnot only the real Trotskyites, but also
those who wavered at some time toward Trotskyism, and
then long ago -came away from Trotskyism; not only
those who are really Trotskyite agents for wrecking, but
also those who happened once upon a time to go along
a street where s&e Trotskyite or other had once passed?
At any rate, such voices were heard here at the plenum.
Can we consider su& an interpretation of the resolution
to be correct? No, we cannot consider it to be correct.
On this question, as on all other questions, there must
be an individual, differentiated approach. You must not
measure everyone with the same yardstick. Such a sweeping approach can only harm the cause of struggle against
the real ~rotskyitewreckers and spies.
Among our responsible comrades there are a certain
number of former Trotskyites who left Trotskyism long
ago, and now fight against Trotskyism not worse but
better than some of our respected comrades who never
chanced to waver toward Trotskyism. It would be foolish
to vilify such comrades now.
Among our comrades there are also those who always
stood against Trotskyism ideologi~ally,but in spite of
this kept up personal contacts with individual Trotsky48
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ites, which they did not delay in liquidating as soon as
the actual visage of Trotskyism became clear to them.
It is, of course, not a good thing that they did not break
off their personal friendly .connections with individual
Trotskyites at once, but belatedly. But it would be silly
to lump such comdes
tes.

3. What does it mean-to select workers correctly, and
*

to distribute them correctly at work?
This means to select workers, in the first place, accoding to a political criterion-that is, are they worthy o r
political trust? And, in the second place, according to a
practical critetion-that is, are they suitable for such and
such concrete work?
This does not mean to (converta businesdike approach
into a "business man's" approach in which people are
interested in the practical qualities of workers, but are
not interested in their political physiognomy.
This does not mean to convert a political approach
into the single and allemblrdcng approach in which
people are interested in the political physiognomy of
workers,, but are not interested in their practical qualifications.
Can it' be said that this Bolshevik rule is carried our
by.our Party comrades? ~nfortunately,it cannot be said.
It has already been spoken of here at the plenum. But
not everything was said. The fact is ,that this well-tried
rule is violated bright and left in our practice and, moreover, in the grossest 'way. Most frequently, workers are
selected not acording to objective ui terii, but accord-
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ing to accidental, subjective, narrow and provincial criteria. Most frequently so-called acquaintances are chosen,
personal friends, fellow townsmen, people who have
shown personal devotion, masters of eulogies to their
patrons, irrespective of whether they are suitable from a
political and a business-like!standpoint.
Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible
workers. a family group, a company, is formed, the members of which try to live peacefully, not to offend each
other, not to wash their dirty linen in public, to eulogize
each other and from time to time to send inane and
nauseating reports to the center about successes.
It is not difficult to understand that in such conditions
of kinship there can be no place either for criticism of
the shortcomings of the work, or for self-criticism by
the leaders of the work.
Naturally, such conditions of kinship create a favorable.
environment for generating bootlickers, people without
any sense of digpity,*and therefore. having nothing in
common with Bolshevism.
Take, for example, 'comrades Minoyan and Vainov.
The former is secretary of the regional Party organization in Kazakstan; the latter is secretary of the ~aroslav
regional Party organization. These people are not 'the
most backward workers in our midst. And how do they
select workers?
The former dragged along with him from Azerbaijan
and the.Urds, where he formerly worked, into KaialEstan
thirty or forty of his "own" people, and placed them in
responsible positions in Kazakstan.
45
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t O o d t s. i~ i m $ a nand 'Vaiaav,
awing to some circumstances or:athieF, :irk ~ransfekixl
fiam ti&f$*
t @ke-Waf:work tJl imme other. .@ice.
Ham shoyklt:Yhby - : in!I 'm& a':
re gap ding & k t
"t~&P?:W4fll
'rha)r7 imsIrly ham!;aci d@g hexh .dong1once
' . ,
xmore~to &&r qhplplace 'dwork?
i TMd is 1~
s&kUtdity rmUlaing Erbm the violatiow of
the 1)olshevik rule on. the correct selection andtdistrikju.
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4 . What does it mean-to verify workers, to check
.
.
up
on the fulfilment of tmh?
I

CONCLUDING SPEECH
T o verify workers .means to check u p not on their.
promises and dklarations, but on the result of their
work.
To verify the fulfilment of tasks means to check up on
them, not only in the office and not only according to
formal reports, but first and foremost to check up on
them at their place of work, according to the actual results of fulfilment.
Do we need such a verification in general? Undoubtedly we do. We need it, in the first place, because only
such a check-up will make it possible to know a worker,
to determine his real qualities. We need it, in the second
place, because only such a verification will make it possible to determine the good qualities and shortcomings
of the executive apparatus. We need it, in the third place,
because only such a &&-up will make it possible to
determine the good qualities and shortcomings of the
tasks themselves.
Some comrades think that people can only be checked
up on from above, when the leaders check up on subordinates, on the results of their work. This is not true.
.Check-up from above is necessary, of course, as one of
the effective measures for verifying people and checking
up the fulfilmeAt. of tasks; But verification from above
does not exhaust by far the whole business of verification.
There is still another kind of verification, the check-up
from below, in 'which the masses, the subordinates, verify
the leaders, point out their mistakes, and show the way
of correcting them. This kind of verification is.one of the
most effective methods of checking up on people. .
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The rank-and-file members verify their leaders at meetings of active Party workers, at conferences and congresses, by listening to their reports, by criticizing defects,
and finally by electing or not electing some or other
leading comrades to. the leading Party organs. Precise
operation of democratic centralism in the Party as demanded by our Party statutes, unconditional electiveness of Party organs, the right to put forward and to
withdraw candidates, the secret ballot and freedom of
criticism and self-criticism-all these and similar measures
must be carred into life, in order to facilitate the checkup on, and control over, the leaders of the Party by the
rank-and-file Pmty members.
The.- non-Party masses check their economic, trade
union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party active
workers, at all kinds of mass conferences, where they hear
reports of their leaders, criticize defects and indicate ways
of correcting them. Finally, the people check leaders of .
the -counuy during the elections to the Soviet Union
organs..of power, through universal, equal, direct and
secret (ballot*
The task is to link up the check from .above with that
from below.
'

m

5. What does it mean to train cadres on the basis of
their o*n mistakes?
Lenin taught .that one of the surest means of correctly
training and educating Party cadres, of correctly trainiq
-and educating the working class and the masses of the
working people, is to disclose conscientiously the mistakes
48
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of the Pmy, to study the causes t . 4 ~
have given rise to
.these mistakes, and to indicate the p a . h necessary for,
overcoming these mistakes.
Lenin said:

"The attitude of a political party toward its own
mistakes is one of the most important and surest
criteria of the seriousness of the party, and of how
it fulfils, in practice, its obligations toward its clam
and toward the masses of werking people. T o admit
a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyze
the conditions wliich gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it-thek are the signs
of a serious party; #&ismeans the perforniahce of its
duties, this means educating and training the class
and,. subsequently, the masses."
t

This means that the Bolshevib are in duty bound not
to gloss over their mis-takes, not tododge the question
of their mistakes, as often happens with us, but honestly
and openly to admit their mistakes, honestly and openly
to indicate the way of correcting these mistakes, honestly
and openly to correct them.
I wauld not say that many of our comrades undertake
this business with- atisfaction. Buts if. the Bolsheviks
really wish. to b6 Bolsheviks they must, find sullicient
manliness in themselve openly to admit their mistakes,.
to reveal their.cawsI to indicate the way of correcting
them, and thereby ts give the Party cadres correct training and correct political education.
For it is oaly .anthis paths only tq.iaptm ;uzd ho-t,
a t

,
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selfaiticism, that Bolshevik cadres really can be educated, that real Bolshevik leaders can be educated.
Two examples will illustrate the correctness of Lenin's
thesis.
Let us take, as one example, our mistakes connected
with the building up of the collective farms. You remember, I imagine, the year iggo, when our Party comrades
thought of solving the very complicated question of transferring the peasantry to the building of collective farms
in some three to four months, and when the Central
Committee of the Party found itself compelled to put a
check upon comrades who were being carried away. This
was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our
Party. The mistake lay in this: that our Party comrades
forgot the voluntary character of the building of collective farms, forgot that the peasants must not be transferred to the collective farm path by administrative pressure, forgot that the building of collective farms required
not several months, but several years of careful and wellplanned work.
They forgot all this, and did not want ,to admit their
mistakes. You remember, I imagine, that the directions
of the Central Committee regarding dizziness from success, and that our comrades in the localities should not
leap ahead, ignoring the actual state of affairs, were met
with hostility. But this did not prevent the Central Committee from going against the stream, and turning our
Party comrsdes onto the right road. Well, then?
It is now dear to everybody that jhe Party achieved
what it wanted by turning our P a r t y ~ o onto;
d
the
Z

,
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right road. We now have tens of thousands of splendid
peasant cadres engaged in the building of collective
farms, and in their leadership these cadres grew up and
were trained on the basis of the mistakes of iggo. But
we would not now have had these cadres had not the
Party then recognized these mistakes and corrected them
in time,
The other example is from the field of industrial construction. I have in mind our mistakes in the Shakhty
wrecking period. Our mistakes lay in the fact that we did
not take into account all the dangers of the technical
backwardness of our cadres in industry, that we put up
with this backwardness, and thought of developing socialist industrial construction on a wide scale with the
inimically-inclined specialists, dooming our economic
cadres to play the part of poor commissars for the bourgeois specialists.
You remember, I imagine, how unwilling our economic
cadres were to recognize their mistakes at that time; how
unwilling they were to recognize their own technical
backwardness, and with what difficulty they assimilated
the slogan "Master Technique". Well, then, the facts go
to show that the slogan "Master Technique", had its
effects, and produced its good results. We now have tens
and hundreds' of thousands of splendid Bolshevik eco
nomic cadres, who have already mastered technique and
are advancing our industry. But we would not now .have
these cadres had the PBrty not risen to the occasion, in
the face of the obduracy of the business executives who
did not want to admit their technical backwardness, had
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not the Par~ythen recognized its mistakes and
tnqn in tiny,.
Some qmrades say w t it .bnot advisable to speak
: apeply of one's mistakes, since the open admission o
oqe'smistakes may be co&trued by our enemie
neq an$ may be utilized by them
This is rubbish, comrades, downright r
open recognition of our mistakes and their
fiation can, on the contrary, only strengthe
raise its authority in the eyes of the worke
and working intellectuals, and increase the st
power of our state. And this is the main thing.
as we have the workers, peasants and working intelle
.
tuals with us, all the rest will settle itself.
other comrades say that the open admission of oud
mistakes can lead, not to training and consolidating o
cadres, but to weakening and disconcerting them; tha
we must spare and tatre care.of our c a d r ~ ;+at we mus
spare their self-&teem and tg-anq~ilit~.'
,TO this end the
prqp~sedto slur,,ov.er the mistakes of our comrades, t
w&zlcq:,@evigor an$ the criticism and, still better,
disregand these mistzkss. Such a line is not only f
mentally incorreqt, but also dangerous in the h
dep;ree-dangeruww. b t and foremost, for the c
wham they wwt, to. "spare" and "take care of".
T o spare: Ad preserve cadres by slurring OV& thei
mistakes mean! ,certainly to ruin these very .cadres. W
would surely have ,ruined our collective farin Bolshevi
cadres.had'yenot revealed the mistakes of the year+lgio,
a$ had ~ J not..
G traincd them on the basis of rhese mis
'

I
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takes. We would certainly have ruined our industrial
Bolshevik cadres had we not revealed the mistake%of our
comrades in the Shakhty wrecking period, and had we
not trained ou; induskkt1 cadres on the basis of these
mistakes. He who expects to spare the self-esteem of ourcadres by slurring over their mistakes ruins both the
cadres and their self-esteem, for by slurring over their
mistakes he facilitates the repetition of new and perhaps
more serious mistakes which, one may presume, will lead
to the complete downfall of the cadres, to the detriment
of their "self-esteem" and "tranquility".
o. eni in taught us not only to teach the masses, but
also to learn from them.
What does this mean?.
It means, first, that we leaders must not become canceited; and we must understand that if we are members
of the Central Committee or are People's Commissars,
this .does not mean that we possess all the knowledge
necessary for giving correct leadership. An official p s i rion by itself does not provide knowledge and experience.
-This is still more' the case in respect to 'a title.
This means, second, that 'our. experience alone, the
ekpe'iefice of leaders, is insufficient to give correct leadership; that, consequently; it is necessary that one%experietice; the experience of leaders, be supplemented by the
experience of the masses, b y the experience of the rankand-file Party members, by the experience of the working
class, by the experiend of the people.
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This means, third, that' we must not for one moment
weaken, and still less break, our connection with the
Inasses.
This means, fourth, that we must pay careful attention
to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rank-andfile members of the Party, to the voice of the so-called
"small men", to the voice of the people.
What does it mean-to lead correctly?
This does not at all mean sitting in one's office and
compiling instructions.
T o lead correctly means:
First, to find a correct solution of the question. But a
correct solution cannot be found unless account is taken
of the experience of the masses, who test the results of
our leadership on their own bach.
Second, to organize the operation of the comct .solution which, however, cannot be done without direct aid
from the masses.
Third, to organize a check on the fulfilment of this
decisiowhich, again, cannot be done without the
d k t aid of the masses.
We leaders see things, events and people from one
side only; I would say, from above. Our field of vision,
consequently, is more or less limited.
The masses, on the contrary, see things, events and
people from another side; I would say, from below. Their
field of vision, consequently, is also in a certain degree
limited. T o receive a correct solution to the question
these two experiences must be united. Only in such a
case will the leadership be correct.

CONCLUDING SPEECH
This is what it means not only to teach the masses,
but also to learn from them.
Two examples to illustrate the correctness of this
thesis of Lenin:
It happened several years ago. We members of the
Central Committee had discussed the question of improving the situation in the Don Basin. The draft of
measures presented by the People's Commissariat of
Heavy Industry was clearly unsatisfactory. The draft was
returned to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry
three times. Three times we received different drafts from
- the People's Commissariat of Heavy idu us try. And still
they could not be considered satisfactory. Finally we decided to call in several workers and rank-and-file economic and trade union officialsfrom the Don Basin.
For three days we conversed with these comrades. And
all of us, members of the Central Committee, had to
recognize that only they, the rank-and-file workers, these
"small people", had succeeded in providing us with a
correct solution. You remember, I imagine, the wellknown decision of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars regarding the measures for
increasing the output of coal in the Don Basin. Well, this
decision of the Central Committee and the Council of
People's Commissars, which was admitted by all our
comrades to be a correct and even notable decision, was
suggested to us by simple people from below.
Another example I have in mind is the example of
Comrade Nikolayenko.
Who is Nikolayenko? Nikolayenko is a rank-and-file
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member-of the Party. She is an ordinary "little person".
For a whole year she gave warning signals as to the bad
situation in the Kiev Party organization, exposed. the
prevalence of family favoritism, the narrow and provincial approach to workers, the suppression of selfcriticism
and the predominance of Trotskyist wreckers. She was
shunned as though she were an annoying fly. Finally, in
order to rid theniselves of her, they expelled her from
the Party.
Neither the Kiev organization nor the Central Committee of the Oommunist Party of the Ukraine helped
her to achieve the truth. It was only the interference of
the Central Committee of the Party that helped to unravel this confused knot. And what emerged after the
examination of the affair? It emerged that Nikolayenko
was right, while the Kiev organization was wrong.
Neither more nor less. And who is this Nikolayenko?
She was not, of course, a member of the Central Committee. She was not a People's Commissar, nor the secretary of the Kiev Regional organization. She was not
&en secretary of some Party cell. She was only a simple
rank-and-file Party member.
As you see, simple people sometimes prove rn be far
nearer to the:truth than some highly placed institutions.
One:c0u1d'~ivetens and hundreds of such examples. .
Thvs it turns out that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is still by far inadequate for the
guidance of our affairs..Inorder to guide co~ectly,the experience of the leaders must be supplemented - by &e
experience of the Pany masses, by the ekperience of the
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working class, by the experience of the toilers, by the
experience of the seca11cd ''mall people".
' And when is this possible?
1t is possible only if the leaders are dosely connected
- with the masses, if they are bound up with the Party
masses, with the working class, with the peasantry, with
. .the working intellectuals.
Contacts with the masses, the strengthening of these
contacts, readiness to listen to the voice of the massesin this lie the strength and impregnability of Bolshevik
leadership.
It may be taken as a rule that so long as Bolsheviks
keep contacts with the broad masses of the people, they
will be invincible. And,. contrariwise, it is sufficient for
Bolsheviks to break away from the masses and lose contact with them, to become covered with bureaucratic
rash, for them tozloseall their strength and become converted into nonentities.
In the system of mythology of the andent. Greeks there
was one famous hero, Antaeua, Who, as mythology declares, was the son of Poseidon, the God of the sea, and
Gaea, the Goddess of the~arth.He was pirticularly
attached. to his mother, who bore him, fed him and
brought him up so that there was no hero whom this
Antaeus5did not vanquish. He was considered to be an
invincible 'hero. - ~ h e i e i nlay his strength? It lay in the
fact thaievery tinhe he was hard-pushed in a struggle with
an opponent, he touched the earth, his mother, who had
borne him and' fed him, and thus regained new strength.
But, nevertheless, he had a weak spot-the danger of
*
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being separated, in some way, from the earth. HIS enemies took account of this weakness of his, and waited for
him. And an enemy was found who took advantage of
this weakness and vanquished him. This was Hercules.
But how did Hercules defeat him? He tore him from the
earth, raised him into the air, deprived him of the
possibility of touching the earth, and thus throttled him
in the air.
I think that Bolsheviks remind us of Antaeus, the hero
of Greek mythology. Like Antaeus, they are strong in
keeping contact with their mother, with the masses, who
bore them, fed them and educated them. And as long
as they keep contact with their mother, with the people,
they have every chance of remaining invincible.
This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik leadV
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7. Finally, still a60ther question. I have'in view the

quation of the formal and heartless bureaucratic attitude of some of our Party comrades toward the fate of
indi-vidual Party members, toward the question of expelling nembers from the Party, or the question of
restoring the rights of Party membership to those who
have been expelled.
The fact is that some of our Party leaders suffer from
lack of attention to people, to Party members, to workers. Furthermore, they do not study the Party members,
do not know what is dose to their hearts, and how they
are growing, do not know workers in general. They b v e ,
therefore, not an individual approach to Party members,

CONCLUDING SPEECH
to Party workers. And just because they have not an individual approach when appraising Party members and
Party workers, they usually act at random, either praising
them wholesale, without measure, or crushing them, also
wholesale, and without measure, expelling thousands and
tens of thousands from the Party.
Such leaders try, in general, to think in tens of thousands, not to worry about "units", about individual Party
members, about their fate. They think it a mere bagatelle
to expel thousands and tens of thousands of people from
the Party, comforting themselves by the fact that our
Party is 2,000,000 strong, and that tens of thousands of
people expelled cannot change anything in the position
of the Party.
But, only people who in essence are profoundly antiParty can have such an approach to members of the
Party.
As the result of such a heartless attitude toward
people, toward Party members and Party workers, discontent and bitterness are artificially created in a section of the Party, while the Trotskyite doubledealers
adroitly seize hold-of such embittered comrades and skillfully drag them after themselves into the morass of
Trotskyite wrecking.
The Trotskyites, by themselves, were never a big korce
in our Party. Call to mind the last discussion on Trotskyism in our Party in 1927. This was a genuine Party referendum. Out of 854,000 Party members, 730,000 members voted at that time. Among them, 724,000 Party members voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central Committee
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of the Party, against the Trotskyites, and 4,000 Party
members, or about one-half of one per cent, voted for the
Trotskyites, while 2,600 members of the Party refrained
from voting.
There were ing,ooo members who did not participate
in the voting. They did not participate either because
they were away from home, or because their shift was at
work when the vote was taken. If, to the 4,000 who voted
for the Trotskyites, we add all those who refrained from
voting, on the assumption that they also sympathized
with the Trotskyites, and'if to this total we add, not onehalf of one per cent of those who did not take part in the
voting-as should be done by right-but five per cent of
those who did not participate-that is, about 6,ooo.Party
membe~-we obtain about 12,000 Party members who
sympathized with Trotskyism to some extent or other.
Here you see the total forces of the Trotskyite gentlemen.
Add to this the fact that many out of this number
became disillusioned with Trotskyism and left it, and
you get a conception of the insignificance of the Trotskyite forces. And if, in spite of this, the Trotskyite wreckers
nevertheless. have some reserves or other around our
Party, it is because the incorrect policy of some of our
comrades on the question of expulsion from the Party
and reinstatement of expelled people, the heartless attitude of some of our comrades toward the fate of individual Party members and individual Party workers,
artificially engender a number of discontented and embittered people, and thus create these reserves for the
Trotskyites.

#
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A large number art: expelled for msalled
What is passivity? It is considered, we discover, that if
a member of thp Pm.y has not mastered the Party program, he is
and due for expulsion. But this i s
not right, comrades. The statutes of our Party cannot be
interpreted' so pedantically. To master the Party program one. needs to be a real Marxist, a tested and theoretically trained Marxist. I do not know whether many
Party members will be found by us in the party who have
already mastered our program, have become genuine
Maqists, theoretically trained and tried. If we were to
go further along this path, we should have to 'leave only
intellectuals and learned people in general 'in the Party.
Who wants such a Party? We have the Leniniet formula
about Party membership which is verified, has stood all
tests. According to this formula, a Party member is one
who accepts the Party program, pays membership dues
and works in one of its organizations.
Note that Lenin's formula does not' speak about mastering the program, but of accepting,the program. These
are two entirely different 'things.There is no need to
prove Lenin was right here - a d not our Party comrades
who ,vainly
'
mouthed about mastering the program. It is
obvious by itseI£. If the Party took the standpoint that
Party members om be only those comrades who have
already ' ~ t e r e dthe program and have become theoretically trained Marxists, it would not have formed
thousands of Party circles in the Party, hundreds of
Party schools where the Party members are taught M-ism and are helped to .&aster our program: It is quite
a
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dear that if the Party organizes schools and circles
among the Party members, it is because it knows that
the Party members have not yet succeeded in mastering
the Party program, have not yet succeeded in becoming
theoretically trained Marxists.
Consequently, to correct our policy on the question of
membership of the Party and expulsion from the Party,
it is necessary to put an end to the present blockheaded
interpretation of the question of passivity.
But we have still another error in this field. The fact
is that our comrades do not recognize the mean between
two extremes. It is sufficient for a worker, a Party member, to commit some small offense, to be late two or
three times at a Party meeting, not to pay membership
dues for some reason or other, and in a flash he is thrown
out of the Party.
No interest is taken in cne degree of his offense, the
cause of his non-appearance at the meeting, the cause
of the non-payment of membership dues. The bureaucracy of this is simply unparalleled. It is not difficult to
understand that, precisely as the result of such a heartless
policy, splendid skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites,
have been thrown out of the Party. And was it impossible, before expelling them from the Party, to give a
warning, and if this had no effect, to censure them, or
administer a reprimand, and, if this had no effect, to set
a period for reformation, or in the extreme case to reduce
to the position of a candidate, but not expel them with
a sweep of the hand from the Party?
Of course it was possible.
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But this requires an attentive attitude to people, to
the Party
. members, to the fact of Party membership. And
this is exaktlv what some of our comrades lack.
It is high time to
?&
uta.;a stop
- to this outrageous practice,
:
.comrades.
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THE END
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